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Abstract
This paper attempts to apprehend the essence and the meaning of consumption and production as virtuous activities
in cultural evolution. This is done from a combined perspective of cultural evolution and a phenomenological inquiry
into human existence and consciousness. It will be shown that the theories of Adam Smith, Veblen, and Bourdieu con-
verge on the logic of this evolution and on the principle of division of society into different classes with different virtues,
and that this evolution draws on the virtues of freedom and independence on the one hand and industry and parsimony
on the other, culminating in the virtuous activities of consumption and production. The principle of habituation of the
apperceptive activity of mind plays a central role in these theories. Our phenomenological inquiry focuses on the prior-
ity of practical dealings in man’s existence à la Heidegger, and on the transcending act of consciousness á la Husserl. It
will be argued that cultural evolution hinges on an interplay of the two principles : institutionalization of dispositions in
accordance with the logic of division, and the transcending act of consciousness toward pure essences and the absolute
basis of the intersubjectivity.
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1. Introduction
Whether socio-economic order in which man’s
existence unfolds its possibilities by his free spirit
is a universe that evolves spontaneously or an ar-
rangement of an artificial design is a matter of
primary importance in apprehending the essence
of man’s activities in the context of cultural evolu-
tion. Upholding the view that such order is a
spontaneous process, not a taxis, this paper ad-
dresses the issue of how to capture the essence of
consumption and production in relation to cul-
tural evolution. We do so from a combined per-
spective of socioeconomic and cultural evolution
and a phenomenological consideration of human
existence and consciousness, abstaining from pos-
iting any ideational type, be it homo oeconomicus,
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or homo sociologicus, or any other type. Whether
individual agents are abstracted as homo
oeconomicus (dictated by the instrumental ration-
ality), or as homo sociologicus (possessed with in-
stitutionalized dispositions for behaving in confor-
mity with common normative values), they are
teleological agents acting always to achieve an
end, hence necessarily deliberate on suitable
means to be chosen, for whatever profits they
pursue, socio-symbolic or real. Hence, the pruden-
tial wisdom and the circumspective vision, how-
ever they may be defined, are required for man
to behave efficaciously under any circumstance
and under any environment. Moreover, the es-
sence of consumption and production is better ap-
prehended as the virtues that have evolved from
cultural and socio-economic evolution. If so, any
understanding of consumption and production
will be incomplete, until both are grasped as an
intertwined pair of virtuous activities essential
for the dynamics of the socio-economic develop-
ment.
In the traditional theory of consumer choice,
powerful in its own right, individual preferences
are the givens, assumed to meet a certain set of
axioms that assure the regularity of choice be-
havior, and this behavior is grasped as a consis-
tent relation to the budget constraint［see, e.g.,
Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995］. Any so-
cial or cultural element that is pertinent to con-
sumption behavior is assumed away behind the
presumption that choice behavior is instrumen-
tally rational, hence can be abstracted as a means
-end relation. In the case of socially acquired dis-
positions, however, individual agents behave
symbolically, in reference to a system of symbol-
ism (a product of cultural evolution). In such
cases, the preferences of individual agents are
rightly seen as endogenously shaped within the
cultural environment in which they are embed-
ded. We believe that placing consumption, or,
more generally, all human activities, in a bigger
picture of cultural evolution makes it possible to
understand man’s activities as the essential
player of the spontaneous force of the cultural
evolution.
In my paper［Hayakawa (2000)］, which is an
outgrowth of another paper［Hayakawa and
Venieris (1977)］, I argued that social interdepend-
ence through consumer choice should be ab-
stracted as interdependence via reference groups
and that the status seeking is an essential part of
this interdependence. I then presented a sequen-
tially satisficing model of a social norm-guided
consumer choice that answers many of the con-
cerns that had been raised against the conven-
tional theory of choice. This model reflected the
decision making environment in two respects :
(1) the limiting conditions of the environment (in-
cluding the limited power of cognition) that cause
the rationality of agents to be bounded, hence
raising the issue of where to search for heuristic
solutions in order to reduce the cost of complex
problem solving, and (2) the properties of the so-
cial space, in particular, the life-styles of social
groups (viewed as capital in the form of consump-
tion technologies) as the source of such solutions.
The paper demonstrated that a reasonable social
norm-oriented behavior, under the emulation and
avoidance motives, is rational by the criterion of
rationality in the traditional theory of consumer
choice, but with one major difference, in that the
norm-guided ordering of choice alternatives is
convoluted with the social facts about (i) the dis-
tribution of social classes on the social status lad-
der, (ii) their life-styles, and (iii) the popularity of
the goods that comprise these life-styles. The pa-
per hinted that the norm-guided choice behavior,
when combined with the motives of social status
seeking, is a driving force of the economy. But, it
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did not address the issue from the perspective of
cultural evolution. This paper, therefore, is, par-
tially, my renewed attempt to recapture not only
such norm-guided behavior but also the essence
of consumption and production in a broader pic-
ture of cultural evolution.
In this paper I will take up the three major
theories of cultural evolution and institutionaliza-
tion in economics and sociology, namely, the theo-
ries of Adam Smith, Veblen, and Bourdieu, along
with Parson’s theory of social systems, in order to
comprehand where these theories converge on
the dialectic of cultural evolution and on the prin-
ciple of class division, by focusing on the virtues
of consumption and production that result from
this evolution. We will look at the process of cul-
tural evolution and the essence of human activi-
ties from another perspective : a phenomenologi-
cal inquiry into human existence and conscious-
ness, since culture and activities in it are made
possible by the act of consciousness and originate
in practical dealings. It is hoped that our discus-
sion, although preliminary, will lead to a better
understanding of the essence of consumption and
production, or human activities in general, as the
determined and determining player of the dy-
namics of the socio-economic and cultural evolu-
tion, in which man’s spirit to transcend to a limit-
less region of pure essences or ideas plays a vital
role.
2. Institutionalization and consumption
activities
The theories of Adam Smith, Veblen, and Bour-
dieu are among the major theories on the theme
of cultural evolution. Here, I will review, in par-
ticular, Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Senti-
ments (1759), Veblen’s The Theory of the Leisure
Class (1925), and Bourdieu’s The Logic of Practice
(1990) and Distinction (1984). This review will be
supplemented by Parsons’ theory of institutionali-
zation in The Social System (1952), in which he ex-
plicitly sets forth the conditions to be met if soci-
ety remains as a stable order.
There is a good reason why we take the issue
of cultural evolution seriously. In recent years, a
great many attempts have been made to grasp
the interdependence aspect in consumer choice
by modifying the conventional framework of
analysis. Such modifications have undoubtedly
helped identify various sources of externalities
arising from consumer choice. Most of them, how-
ever, have remained within the confine of the tra-
ditional theory, by including only new variables
in the list of the arguments in the utility function.
Among such variables are : other consumers’
consumption or income, or, average consumption
or income, or even the prices of certain goods.
The rationale for such inclusion has been attrib-
uted to the influence of the culture of invidious
comparison, real or pecuniary, or to the psycho-
logical makeup of man’s psyche getting some sort
of satisfaction from comparison. Under such influ-
ences, one’s consumption, income, or wealth is
compared with those of other individuals for their
relative standing, and the goods are evaluated
not only for their sheer utility but also for their
social values. And, even the prices of certain
goods, particularly the prices of those that pos-
sess significant symbolic values, were included in
the same list as the surrogates standing for their
images of social prestige or advantage, or quality.
Although such modifications are not radical,
these examples have yielded many results differ-
ent from what the conventional theory implies,
alerting economists on the validity of the general
equilibrium theory when consumption externali-
ties are present［see Hayakawa (2000) for many
of such examples］.
Despite these efforts, no serious attempt has
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been made to go beyond such modifications and
base the issue of consumer interdependence on a
more systematic analysis of the social space as an
ideational objectivity. We know that many soci-
ologists are opposed to the economist’s rational
choice scheme of instrumental rationality, and a
fortiori to any modification of the sort that has
been attempted as long it stayed within the same
scheme. They hold on to the view that the basic
scheme of the economist is contrary to the spirit
of sociology［e.g., Parsons (1951), Bourdieu (1984,
1990)］. They advocate the idea that social order is
something irreducible to the rational scheme of
instrumental rationality, or, more broadly, to the
self-centered utility maximization of isolated indi-
viduals. Social world or order is an ideational
unity of its kind, which is constructed in the mind
of individual agents in accordance with the laws
of synthesis. Hence, if this order is to be sus-
tained, individual agents must acquire certain du-
rable dispositions vis-á-vis this social space. Par-
sons says in The Social System (1951) that those
schemes that rely only on the motivational ele-
ments of rational instrumental goal-orientation is
inadequate in describing and explaining social
systems and social actions, because the issue of
how the institutionalization of common normative
values (essential for a social system to exist as a
stable order) is brought about is completely left
out (43). Similarly, Bourdieu, in the Logic of Prac-
tice (1990) is critical of any teleological description
of rational agents interacting under perfect infor-
mation of each other’s preferences and competen-
cies, and of any description of the reactions of in-
teracting agents as mechanistic responses (61),
and in Distinction (1984) he criticizes any ap-
proach that considers only economic variables as
insufficient to account for symbolic profits (175-
177).
Thus, to delve more deeply into the problem of
consumer behavior as related to the social and
cultural environment, we need to get hold of how
the motivational structure of an individual con-
sumer becomes institutionalized with the norms
of the culture in which his choice is embedded.
But, because such institutionalization is itself a
cultural phenomenon, answering this question
amounts to understanding consumption (and pro-
duction too, because the two are intimately re-
lated) from the principle of cultural evolution.
This is why the theories of Adam Smith, Veblen,
and Bourdieu are pertinent to our discussion.
Adam Smith, in The Theory of Moral Senti-
ments, advanced a powerful thesis on how man’s
moral sentiments of approbation and disapproba-
tion set off a dialectic movement between pro-
duction and consumption, and Veblen followed
suit with his version of a similar evolutionary the-
ory, beginning with man’s instinct of workman-
ship as the source of this movement. And, more
recently, Bourdieu extended Veblen’s theory into
his idea of habitus with its own logic of practice
that is essential for a similar dialectic movement.
What is the nature of this dialectic between the
virtues of productive activities on the one hand
and the virtues of consumption activities on the
other?
2a. Adam Smith : Moral sentiments
Adam Smith’s thesis, The Theory of Moral Sen-
timents (1759), is known for its elegance in ex-
plaining how our moral sentiments of approba-
tion and disapprobation, combined with moral
faculties, can account for an evolutionary process
of a harmonious economic order. Moral senti-
ments, by instilling ambition in man and by keep-
ing his industry, initiate a race to accumulate
wealth for the purpose of winning the moral ap-
proval of the spectators. This race splits society
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into high ranks (the wealthy) and low ranks (the
poor) with different virtues, the former respect-
ing such virtues as freedom, independence, and
generosity whereas the latter respecting such
virtues as prudence, justice, frugality, industry,
and strict observance of rules. The race also
gives rise to emulation and avoidance as the rich
seeks to distance themselves from low ranks by
setting a new fashion to avoid the meagerness
that their fashion may become associated with
when it has been emulated successfully by those
of low ranks. People of low ranks, however, work
industriously, develop sciences and arts, and pro-
duce innovations, which will enable the economy
to produce fancy contrivances that are acquired
by the wealthy in setting their fashion. The race,
through differentiation of classes and virtues, pro-
duce employment opportunities necessary to
feed the multitude while the economy becomes
more extensive in its order. The principle of cus-
tom and habit, as an extensive principle, mediate
the exact process of evolution by habituating
man’s tastes and the aesthetic sense of beauty
and propriety on all objects of choice, modes, arts,
and judgments. This is Adam Smith’s theory in a
nutshell. The theory is simple yet powerful. Eve-
rything falls into the hand of Providence.
Adam Smith holds that if man is only inter-
ested in the direct utility of anything, the econ-
omy does not develop as an extended order.
There simply won’t be enough driving force. To
make this point, Adam Smith starts Part IV of
The Theory of Moral Sentiments (hereafter, TMS)
with an observation that the utility is one of the
principal sources of beauty (TMS, p. 257) and that
objects of happy contrivance produced by the art
of production are valued more than the end for
which they are produced and that the whole
merit of such objects consists in attaining them
with this attainment being worth all the toil and
the adjustment of the means to acquire them
(TMS, p. 258). A refined watch is a good example :
What interests man is not so much the conven-
ience and the knowledge that it affords as the re-
fined nature of the good itself (TMS, p. 259). But,
this subtle difference makes an enormous differ-
ence in the way the economy develops its order.
The raw utility that articles of conveniency
yields is limited and does not justify the toil
needed to attain it. But if such articles become ob-
jects of admiration by spectators, the merit of ac-
quiring them takes on a different meaning and
man’s striving needed to acquire them collects a
force that perpetuates and drives economic de-
velopment. When a poor man is exposed to the
articles of conveniency displayed by the rich,
there arises in him ambition to be wealthy by be-
ing industrious. Man’s endeavors to acquire tal-
ents, professions, better jobs and his willingness
to bear the required burden of hardship and sac-
rifice all originate in this ambition, although those
observable articles of vanity sought so earnestly
do not yield much of the conveniency dreamed of,
in comparison with cheaper articles of similar
utility (TMS, pp. 259-261). The principal cause of
this quest for elegant contrivances as means of
happiness is rooted in man’s proclivity to pay
more attention to the sentiments of others for his
mode of living and in man’s belief that such fancy
contrivances are objects of admiration and ap-
plaud of the spectator, although this belief is sepa-
rate from how much such goods contribute to the
happiness of their masters (TMS ; pp. 261-262).
The economy produces elegant contrivances
through industrious endeavors, and man works
diligently to acquire them as objects of admira-
tion. Then the wealth as power to access such ob-
jects acquires the symbolic status of something
grand. These are all confounded into a view that
man’s unceasing endeavors to turn out fancy
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goods of contrivance and man’s ambition to win
admiration of others by becoming wealthy and
obtain such goods are all part of the harmonious
movement of the system (TMS, p. 263). On this
grand beauty of the system, Smith says :
. . . . . If we consider the real satisfaction which
all these things are capable of affording, by it-
self and separated from the beauty of that ar-
rangement which is fitted to promote it, it will
always appear in the highest degree contempt-
ible and trifling. But we rarely view it in this
abstract and philosophical light. We naturally
confound it in our imagination with the order,
the regular and harmonious movement of the
system, the machine or economy by means of
which it is produced. The pleasures of wealth
and greatness, when considered in this com-
plex view, strike the imagination as something
grand and beautiful and noble, of which the at-
tainment is well worth all the toil and anxiety
which we are so apt to bestow upon it. (TMS, p.
263).
The economy is a grand and harmonious order.
People find a real source of satisfaction in fancy
goods of contrivance as objects of admiration ;
the system arranges itself beautifully by keeping
people industrious ; wealth is sought as some-
thing noble ; and the economy expands as a har-
monious order with increasing opportunities of
employment for the multitude. There is nothing
intrinsic about such confounding of satisfaction,
beauty, order, and nobility. It is part of Provi-
dence, although it may be a deception, that keeps
the industry of mankind in perpetual motion and
the economy as an extending order. The fact is
that industry and ambition to be wealthy and ac-
quire fancy goods of contrivance as objects of ad-
miration is the source of all sorts of innovations
that embellish our life and push the frontiers of
sciences and arts. Our economy expands through
this quest for more elegant contrivances, and the
order of the economy never loses its harmony as
the wealthy, whose stomach is far less than their
desires for conveniency, consume only a small
but the most precious portion of the output pro-
duced in the economy while the rest trickles
down to lower levels to feed those who actually
produce the trinkets and baubles enjoyed by the
great (TMS, p. 263-264). Our love for the beauty
of order and elegant contrivances permeates our
desire for better institutions that promote the
public welfare (p. 265-268). Thus, the moral senti-
ments for approbation and disapprobation rouse
man’s ambition and industry, spawn innovations,
promote development of sciences and arts, adore
accumulation of wealth, extend the order of the
economy with the employment of the multitude,
and advance better institutions for public wel-
fare, all part of Providence that sees to it that the
entire system be kept in a harmonious movement
without leaving any part unaccounted for.
Elaborating on the origin of ambition and the
distribution of ranks (Ch. II, Section II, Part I, pp.
70-83), Adam Smith argues that because we, in
our moral sentiments, are disposed to sympathize
more with joy than with sorrow, we want to dem-
onstrate our riches and conceal our poverty, and
that because of such moral sentiments, we pur-
sue riches and avoid poverty (TMS, p. 70). The
end of our ambition is to acquire refined articles
of convenience and to derive from this acquisition
the advantage of sympathy, complacency, and ap-
probation from the spectator. This vanity is only
founded on our belief that we are exposed to the
attention and the approbation of the spectator.
Adam Smith says, “the rich man glorifies in his
riches”, and“the poor man, on the contrary, is
ashamed of his poverty”. And, “the poor man
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goes out and comes in unheeded” (TMS, p. 71),
and “the man of rank and distinction, on the con-
trary, is observed by all the world” (TMS, p. 72). It
is this observation and admiration by others
which renders greatness to the objects of envy,
and compensates all the toil, anxiety, and loss of
leisure that is forfeited in its acquisition (TMS, p.
72).
Despite the grand beauty of a harmonized sys-
tem, Adam Smith is quick to point out that our
disposition to admire the rich and neglect the
poor causes our moral sentiments to be cor-
rupted (TMS, p. 84), although this corruption is
part of the great order. There are two roads man
can take in gaining the admiration of mankind,
either by taking the road to wisdom and virtue or
by taking the road to wealth and greatness. Wis-
dom and virtue are admired only by a select few,
but wealth and greatness are admired by the
multitude. It is by taking the latter road that our
moral sentiments become corrupted, but this cor-
ruption is not uniform. It splits between the infe-
rior and superior stations of life. In the inferior
stations in which most men find themselves, men
develop the virtues of prudence and justice in
seeking professional abilities and in observing the
rules of justice, which are reinforced by the senti-
ments of neighbors. In the superior stations of
life, however, where the success depends on win-
ning the favor of the proud and vain superiors,
the great virtues are tamed by the external
graces of a man of fashion (TMS, p. 87). But, be-
cause of man’s disposition to imitate the living of
the rich, men of the superior stations distance
themselves from men of the lower stations by set-
ting a fashion or a decorum, with all vices and fol-
lies to go with it. Men of the lower stations emu-
late this fashion as a noble object of admiration.
In this way, the fashion set by the rich, through
envy, takes most men away from the road to the
great virtues, as they remain ambitious at emu-
lating this fashion, although it is the illusion that it
would give the successful emulator the joy of a
more generous living and earn the respect and
admiration of the spectator (TMS, p. 88-90).
Those at the lower stations of life are not all mis-
erable, as they, by their virtues of prudence and
justice, work with diligence, produce innovations,
and develop sciences and arts, which are all es-
sential in keeping the economy going as an ex-
tending order. The point is that their moral senti-
ment or disposition is affected with the ambition
to earn the respect and the admiration of the
spectator. It is such affected disposition that is
the source of man’s industry. Thus, the economy
as a harmonious order thrives as a perpetual race
to get the greatness and power of wealth. Cor-
rupt as man’s virtues may be, such corruption is
part of Providential Guidance.
While our moral sentiments become corrupted
under our disposition to emulate the fashion set
by men of the superior stations of life, Adam
Smith holds that how our moral sentiments are
shaped is affected by the principles of custom and
fashion, or by the principle of habituation, which
can cause different judgments of beauty to
emerge in different ages and nations. Repeated
observation of different things habituates our
mind to appreciate similar connections in similar
situations, and such habituation gives rise to our
custom of connecting different things, with the
sense of the propriety or the impropriety of var-
ied combinations of things. Under the principle of
habituation, a fashion, initiated by men of high
ranks of life, through repeated observation, ac-
quires the sense of being something genteel and
magnificent. As this fashion is emulated by men
of inferior ranks, it acquires the character of
meanness and awkwardness and loses its grace it
once had. Custom and fashion are an extensive
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principle as their influence covers all objects of
choice, be they modes of dress, furniture, poetry,
music, architecture, manners, and so on. They
even influence our judgments of the beauty of
natural objects, as in our appreciation of a certain
middle or the general pattern with respect to the
features of things, animate or inanimate. Thus,
custom and fashion habituate our mind to see, or,
even to judge, certain things as beautiful or ap-
propriate and other things as distasteful and in-
appropriate. In Adam Smith’s view, how our
mind sees certain things in certain ways, with the
sense of propriety or impropriety, is not some-
thing that can be assumed given, but rather a
product of custom habituating and impressing
our mind to see things in certain ways, although
custom is not the exclusive principle of beauty
(TMS, p. 288). If custom and habit permeate our
sense of beauty and propriety of things, there is
no reason why they do not influence, in some
way, our sense of beauty on human conduct. But,
this influence will be limited because such virtues
of the inferior ranks of people as parsimonious
frugality, painful industry, and rigid adherence to
rules, are viewed as mean and disagreeable, while
such virtues are also connected with the abject,
cowardly, ill-natured, lying, and pilfering nature
of their disposition (TMS, pp. 291-292). On the
principle of custom and habit, Adam Smith adds
that the golden mean of virtues observed in those
who are most esteemed, being emulated by
many, will guide the course of the development of
the propriety of character and behavior (TMS,
pp. 296-297). Admitting that custom and habit af-
fect what is regarded as agreeable, appropriate,
or beautiful, in seeing things or in determining
conduct, such influences are only limited to the
propriety or impropriety of particular usages of
our virtues or behavior (TMS, pp. 302-303), al-
though it must be admitted that good morals may
be thwarted and seemingly immoral particular
actions may be accepted as lawful and blameless
(TMS, p. 304). But, again, this is all part of the or-
der under the guidance of Providence.
We should not ignore the fact that while Adam
Smith draws a picture of a grand system of har-
mony that originates in our moral sentiments of
approbation and disapprobation, he does not for-
get to place an equal emphasis on the importance
of the general rules of conduct in preserving the
order of our society. He holds that man is en-
dowed with a particular power of perception by
which to distinguish the beauty or the deformity
of passions and affections, and with a peculiar fac-
ulty of the moral sense by which to judge their
own conduct (TMS, p. 223). It is by the power of
this perception and this moral sense that man, by
observing the conduct of other people, forms cer-
tain proper rules of conduct. These rules are not
determined by any a priori examination of what
actions are to be approved or disapproved by
philosophical reasoning, bur rather they are
based on our own experiences of what has been
approved by our moral faculties and our natural
sense of merit and propriety (TMS, pp. 224-25).
Custom and habit may influence the particular
usages of our virtues or behavior, but conduct it-
self has to observe the proper rules of conduct, al-
though such rules themselves cannot escape the
influence of custom and habit as these principles
habituate our sense of beauty and propriety.
Adam Smith holds fast that this regard for the
general rules of morality is, as man’s duty, a prin-
ciple of the greatest consequence in human life,
and only by which man’s actions can be directed
(TMS, p. 229). This principle separates “a man of
principle and honour” from “a worthless fellow”
(TMS, p. 231). Without a reverence for the rules
of morality, the very existence of human society
would crumble into nothing (TMS, pp. 241-32).
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Adam Smith says that the sense of duty is too im-
portant to the happiness of mankind to leave it to
the slow and uncertain artificial reasoning and
philosophy, while noting that religion has already
given sanction to these rules (TMS, pp. 233). The
observance of the rules of conduct is not without
its own recompense ; man’s industry, prudence,
and circumspection have their recompense of
success, wealth, or honors, while the practice of
truth, justice, and humanity has the recompense
of confidence, esteem, and love of others (IMS, p.
236). Smith holds that the observance of the gen-
eral rules of morality can only be supported by
the strongest motives of self-interest, which in-
cludes both self-regarding and other-regarding.
In fact, one without the other is destructive of its
foundation (TMS, p. 241). Thus, Adam Smith ar-
gues convincingly that our natural power of per-
ception, our moral faculties, and our strongest
motives of self-interest will, through experience,
be able to grasp moral rules by which to guide
our conduct in whatever circumstances we find
ourselves, and that these rules keep the human
existence in harmony with the entire system.
This is the grand order of our society as envi-
sioned by Adam Smith. It is a view that connects
all aspects of human existence (tastes, judgments,
production, sciences, arts, innovations, ambition,
industry, employment, the sense of beauty, nobil-
ity, and propriety, and what not) and the eco-
nomic system into a unified picture of a harmoni-
ous order under the principle of custom and
habit.
2 b. Veblen : The culture of the leisure
class
Adam Smith’s theory was inherited by Thor-
stein Veblen, who expounded another version of
an evolutionary theory under the title of The
Theory of the Leisure Class (1925).
For Veblen, man is an agent constantly seeking
to achieve an end through his actions, hence is
possessed of an instinct of workmanship, which is
a socially acquired aptitude or propensity to ap-
preciate the merit of the serviceability and the ef-
ficiency of what man does for his end, over and
against the demerit of the futility and the waste
in his effort, which makes it natural for man to
make comparisons of persons based on visible
demonstration of success (TLC, pp. 29-30). This
instinct, going through different stages of cultural
development, habituates man’s apperceptive ac-
tivity of mind and habituates man’s sense of
beauty, nobility, and propriety as well as his
tastes. Through this habituation, the generic and
the honorific beauty become blended, and the
brute and the honorific reputability become con-
joined. It is this habituation that sets in motion an
evolutionary process of culture and tastes in a
dialectic manner, between the instinct of work-
manship serving as the positive and creative
principle (i.e., the principle of innovation) on the
one hand and the habituated tastes serving as the
negative and regulative principle (i.e., the screen-
ing principle) on the other. The human culture,
going through a series of stages of development,
with wealth and leisure becoming increasingly
more important, evolves into a stage in which the
community splits into different classes, the work-
ing class on the one end and the superior class
(the leisure class) on the other, with different vir-
tues and measures of success. The working class
is characterized by industry and thrift, while the
superior class by wealth and exemption from la-
bor that wealth makes possible. With this class di-
vision, consumption, measured by its pecuniary
strength, becomes another vicarious means to
demonstrate the pecuniary reputability by seiz-
ing those innovations in refined goods for con-
sumption. How to live a life of ostensible leisure,
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by demonstrating refined tastes for manners and
valuable goods becomes just as important as
demonstrating conspicuous leisure.
On the life of an invidious pecuniary culture,
Veblen states :
The accepted standard of expenditure in the
community or in the class to which a person
belongs largely determines what his standard
of living will be. It does this directly by com-
mending itself to his common sense as right
and good, through his habitually contemplating
it and assimilating the scheme of life in which it
belongs ; but it does so also indirectly through
popular insistence on conformity to the ac-
cepted scale of expenditure as a matter of pro-
priety, under pain of disesteem and ostracism.
To accept and practice the standard of living
which is in vogue is both agreeable and expedi-
ent, commonly to the point of being indispensa-
ble to personal comfort and to success in life.
The standard of living of any class, so far as
concerns the element of conspicuous waste, is
commonly as high as the earning capacity of
the class will permit-with a constant tendency
to go higher. The effect upon the serious activi-
ties of men is therefore to direct them with
great singleness of purpose to the largest possi-
ble acquisition of wealth, and to discountenance
work that brings no pecuniary gain. At the
same time the effect on consumption is to con-
centrate it upon the lines which are most pat-
ent to the observers whose good opinion is
sought ; while the inclinations and aptitudes
whose exercise does not involve a honorific ex-
penditure of time or substance tend to fall into
abeyance through disuse. (TLC, p. 86)
Veblen traces how the instinct of workmanship
affects man’s apperceptive activities through suc-
ceeding phases of cultural development, from the
peaceable barbarian or savagery phase in which
the incentive and the scope of emulation is lim-
ited, through the predatory phase in which ex-
ploit and acquisition by war and seizure is
praised more than industrial employment, and
then finally to the quasi-peaceable phase of an in-
cipient organization of industry and private prop-
erty, in which accumulation of wealth becomes a
common basis of esteem in the community while
the highest honors are still granted on predatory
or quasi-predatory efficiency in war or statecraft
(TLC, pp. 36-38). In the quasi-peaceable phase,
the acquisition of wealth, as the source of popular
esteem and self-respect, sets in motion a process
of the struggle for a higher relative standing
against competitors in the community. The in-
stinct of workmanship is thus channelled into a
straining race for pecuniary achievement (TLC,
pp. 38-40). The struggle for reputability is al-
ready started in the predatory phase, being split
into two directions depending on the class. Those
who are bound to work with productive effi-
ciency struggle for increased diligence and parsi-
mony, where as those of the superior class, with
their wealth being predominantly consisting of la-
bor, struggle for abstention from labor as they
consider labor debasing to a spiritual human life
and associate it with a mark of weakness, subjec-
tion, and inferiority (TLC, pp. 41-42). Thus, in the
predatory phase and also in the early part of the
quasi-peaceable stage, the life of leisure is already
established as the most definitive evidence of pe-
cuniary achievement and reputability. But, as
slaves make conspicuous abstention from labor
possible, there will be emulation of the life of lei-
sure by the working class, which inhibits the hab-
its of industry and thrift. Wealth was a direct
meritorious measure of social standing, but now
it is taken over by insistence on the exemption
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from productive labor. Thus, with the working
class emulating the life of exemption from labor,
the life of the leisure class becomes institutional-
ized with all its honorific and meritorious requi-
sites (TLC, pp. 43-45). The institutionalization of
the life of leisure brings with it a refined code of
decorum including tastes, manners, and habits of
life. Manners, which are intrinsically good, now
acquire the honorific character as “the voucher of
a life of leisure”, and being proficient in decorum,
become an irreplaceable means of demonstrating
the life of pecuniary decency (TLC, p. 49). The
race for this proficiency leads to the cultivation of
decorum in many details and to the development
of a comprehensive discipline as a social norm.
Thus, conspicuous leisure grows into a detailed
code of decorum as well as into discriminate
tastes on the decorous nature of consumption
(TLC, p. 50). And, as competition for conspicuous
leisure becomes increasingly strenuous, the lei-
sure class turns to consumption as another
means of demonstrating their pecuniary reputa-
bility, by cultivating their tastes to discriminate
consumption goods based on their nobility, and
by seizing those innovations that turn out more
elaborate goods to be consumed. Thus, demon-
strating refined tastes for manners and consump-
tion becomes an important part of how to live a
life of ostensible leisure, turning conspicuous lei-
sure and consumption into the social norms of the
leisure class (TLC, pp. 60-64).
Man’s habits, complex as they may be, perme-
ate each other. Habits of thought unavoidably af-
fect man’s habitual view of what is good and right
in life. The economic interest is not separate from
other interests in the organic complex of habits of
thought (TLC, p. 88). The canon of conspicuous or
honorific waste traverses the canons of moral
conduct, beauty, utility, ritualistic fitness, and
even scientific sense of truth in the community.
The institution of the sacredness of private prop-
erty is traversed by the habit of accumulating
wealth for the reputable value of conspicuous
consumption (TLC, p. 88-89). Likewise, the can-
ons of reputability permeates the popular sense
of what is useful and beautiful in consumable
goods, as superior articles are appreciated more
often for their honorific serviceability than for
their brute beauty or utility. The cannons of con-
spicuous waste also traverse our sense of what is
beautiful and discriminate consuming articles
(TLC, p. 95). The beautiful and the honorific are
no longer separate ; they meet and blend, mak-
ing the intrinsic beauty of beautiful things insepa-
rable from the honorific service that they confer.
The beauty of an object under this blending,
therefore, subsumes both features, its expensive-
ness and its honorific serviceability (TLC, pp. 95-
97). The beauty in this blended sense is not uni-
form across different classes. Just as classes are
differentiated by their norms of reputability, so
are the matters of taste allowing for diverse
views on what is beautiful. What specifies what
objects meet the criteria of honorific consumption
in different classes is the code of reputability of
the class to which the critic belongs (TLC, pp. 98).
The beauty of an object in the sense of its eco-
nomic efficiency in facilitating the material ends
of life becomes circumvented by our taste for ar-
ticles that give evidence of a reputably wasteful
expenditure (TCL, p. 109). This circumvented
taste is the sense of novelty, that discriminates
goods for their combined effect of ingenuity, os-
tensible economic end, and pecuniary waste
(TLC, pp. 109-110). It subjects the physiognomy
of the objects of choice to the “the selective sur-
veillance of the canon of expensiveness” (TLC, p.
110). The sense of novelty now becomes the
canon of taste for the honorific and the wasteful,
and skillful workmanship or ingenuity becomes
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the ground on which to select goods for their hon-
orific serviceability. The canon of conspicuous
waste thus works as a selective principle (nega-
tive and regulative), not as a creative principle of
innovation and initiative. Whenever innovative
articles or methods are introduced, the canon of
conspicuous waste screens such forms as are fit
as effective means of invidious comparison (TLC,
p. 118). The instinct of workmanship splits into
two principles that govern the course of cultural
evolution, one positive and creative as the princi-
ple of innovation and initiative and the other
negative and regulative as the principle of selec-
tion and surveillance. Refined goods are produced
through man’s industry and creativity, while the
canon of conspicuous waste screens them for
their serviceability as means of invidious com-
parison. The two principles interact.
The instinct of workmanship as man’s aptitude
and the seeking of the honorific reputability
guides the evolution of cultural development.
What appears as an honorific life affects the com-
plex organization of all habits including the ap-
perceptive activity to perceive beauty and man’s
tastes for invidious comparison. The accumula-
tion of wealth gradually brings with it abstention
from labor and the life of leisure as an object of
emulation. The life of leisure is first made possible
by the work done by slaves, but finds other vi-
carious means of demonstration, in refinement of
a code of decorum and in consumption. The
goods for consumption are increasingly sought
not only for their beauty in terms of economic ef-
ficiency that promotes man’s welfare but also for
their serviceability as an evidence of the honorific
consumption. The intrinsic beauty and the honor-
ific serviceability become blended into the sense
of novelty, and acquires the status of a principle
of the selective surveillance for the wealthy class.
While man’s tastes are habituated and culminate
in the sense of novelty, society splits into differ-
ent classes, the wealthy at one end and the work-
ing class at the other, with different virtues. The
wealthy struggle for abstention from labor, and
the working class for increased diligence and par-
simony. As the working class emulates the life of
leisure as something genteel and magnificent,
their habits of industry and thrift are inhibited.
Man’s aptitude to appreciate the workmanship,
rooted in the teleological existence of human be-
ings as acting agents, thus, sets off an evolution-
ary process of wealth accumulation to gain the
honorable reputability along with man’s search
for the effective means of invidious comparison.
The process culminates in the honorific value of
the life of leisure as it becomes institutionalized
as something genteel and magnificent, hence to
be emulated by the rest of the society. Through-
out the process of evolution, man’s habits are in-
fluenced by the apperceptive activity of his mind
which perceives things that brings honor and
reputation as beautiful.
Thus, Veblen’s theory is a theory of a dialectic
between the instinct of workmanship and the
principle of habituation interacting and setting in
motion, along with the accompanying industrial
development, an evolutionary process of cultural
evolution, in which man’s strife to get ahead in
the race of winning invidious comparison and
gaining esteem is just as important as the attain-
ment of impartial well-being. His theory shares
the same insight that runs through Adam Smith’s
thesis that man’s ambition to get ahead in the
race of competition is the basic driving force of
the economy while man’s tastes, habituated to ap-
preciate the life of the rich, may corrupt his vir-
tues and industry.
Veblen’s theme was recapitulated by Bourdieu,
who developed his theory of habitus and its logic
of practice. Bourdieu’s habitus and Veblen’s hab-
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its “as the organic complex of habits of thought
which make up the substance of an individual’s
conscious life” (TLC, p. 88) are of the same nature.
Bourdieu characterizes habitus as “systems of du-
rable, transposable dispositions, structured struc-
tures predisposed to function as structuring
structures” and Veblen views habituation of
man’s apperceptive activity of mind as essential
for the formation of man’s tastes and sense of
beauty, nobility, and propriety, which serve as
the regulating (screening) principle of cultural
evolution. Likewise, in Adam Smith’s theory as
the precursor of Veblen’s, habituation of man’s
mind, as an extensive principle, was crucial to the
shaping of man’s moral sentiments by the princi-
ple of custom and fashion. This habituation comes
from repeated observation of different things,
forming man’s sense of the propriety or the im-
propriety of varied combinations of things. Man’s
sense of beauty, magnificence, the propriety of
things is a product of habituation, without which
a fashion set by the superior class and emulation
of it by the lower classes as something genteel
and magnificent would not follow. As the theories
of Adam Smith and Veblen indicate, the principle
of habituation is crucial to the human existence
and the formation of culture. We can trace it to
Aristotle’s notion of hexis as state of having and
arete as excellence［Nicomachean Ethics］. Bour-
dieu scrutinizes the theme of habitus explicitly,
and characterizes it as a structuring and struc-
tured principle with a logic of practice of its own.
Man encounters many entities in this world and
grasps them as ideal objectivities by the act of in-
tentionality in his mind, but between the two
there must be some phenomenological domain of
laws or the principle of synthesis that makes this
grasping possible. If this domain is understood as
the site of the habitus (the socially acquired dispo-
sitions), it becomes a structuring structure by
which man acts, responds, feels, and judges. Ha-
bituation is the process through which such dis-
positions are formed by internalizing the condi-
tions of existence.
2c. Bourdieu : Habitus and distinction
In Logic of Practice (1990) (hereafter LP), Bour-
dieu, in understanding how man acts in the social
world, returns to the site of socially acquired dis-
positions as pre-adapted schemata that produce
practices that are compatible with the conditions
of existence. He insists that a theory of practice
should be sought neither in objective understand-
ing of social relationships nor in subjective view-
ing which abstains from any objective account of
the social world. Because the objects of knowl-
edge are not passively recorded but rather ac-
tively constructed by the principle of construc-
tion, building a theory of practice has to return to
the very site of this active construction, where
the dialectic of practice, “the dialectic of the opus
operantum and the modus operandi”, unfolds (LP,
p. 52). Bourdieu defines this site as habitus. It is
defined as a set of “systems of durable, transpos-
able dispositions, structured structures predis-
posed to function as structuring structures, that
is, as principles which generate and organize
practices and representations that can be objec-
tively adapted to their outcomes without presup-
posing a conscious aiming at ends or an express
mastery of the operations necessary in order to
attain them” (LP, p. 53). Habitus, being inculcated
with the conditions of existence including the
probabilities and impossibilities, freedoms and ne-
cessities, opportunities and prohibitions, become
compatible with these conditions (LP, p. 54). It is a
virtue created of necessity, to refuse what is de-
nied and to will what is inevitable, preserving the
past ; it preserves past experiences as active
schemes of perception, thought, and action, more
161HAYAKAWA : Consumption and Production as Virtues in Cultural Evolution
reliable than all formal rules and explicit norms
(LP, 54). They connect the internal with the exter-
nal and become the source of the continuity and
regularity in the social world. It is not only the
logic of practice of everyday choices, but also the
generative source of all thoughts, perceptions,
and actions that is historically and socially condi-
tioned. It is a spontaneity in the unconscious,
which forgets history while its objective struc-
tures leave their imprints in the quasi natures of
habitus (LP, 56). Bourdieu says :
Thus the dualistic vision that recognizes
only the self-transparent act of consciousness
or the externally determined thing has to give
to the real logic of action, which brings to-
gether two objectifications of history, objectifi-
cation in bodies and objectification in institu-
tions or, which amounts to the same things,
two states of capital, objectified and incorpo-
rated, through which a distance is set up from
necessity and its urgencies. This logic is seen in
paradigmatic form in the dialectic of expres-
sive dispositions and instituted means of ex-
pression (morphological, syntactic and lexical
instruments, literary genres, etc.) which is ob-
served in the intentionless invention of regu-
lated improvisation. (LP, pp. 56-57).
If the social world into which man is born is al-
ready divided into different classes with different
life-styles or fashions and related conditions of ex-
istence, man will socially acquire certain sche-
mata of thought and practice that will be fit for
the class of his belonging. But, man is engaged in
economic activities, in which innovations, either
in the form of newly designed goods or in the
form of consumption technologies, occur fre-
quently. Such innovations inject new information
into the existing order and disrupt the stability of
the habitus. So, one critical issue that arises when
discussing the function of habitus in assimilating
new information concerns how the habitus keeps
its stability or copes with the new sources of in-
stability or integrates what it has with what it en-
counters newly. Habitus is not a rigid set of dispo-
sitions, but rather a pre-disposed state with its
own dialectic movement. Bourdieu says that this
dialectic is between the stability that it seeks on
the one hand and newly occurring experiences
that may threaten its defense against possible cri-
ses on the other. The movement will remain
dominated by earlier and accumulated experi-
ences through a defense mechanism of rejecting
such information as threatens its stability, possi-
bly by avoiding exposure to such information, al-
though, paradoxically, the habitus needs a higher
piece of information to tell which information is to
be avoided or accepted for its stability. For exam-
ple, if the class distinctions or the life-styles of dif-
ferent classes are defined by privation relative to
what other classes have, it inevitably follows that
the habitus belonging to a given class must be
aware of what it does not have. Bourdieu, focus-
ing on the self-fulfilling nature of the habitus, rec-
onciles this paradox by saying that the avoidance
strategies (or, more fundamentally, the underly-
ing schemes of perception) are “the product of
nonconscious, unwilled avoidance,” be it auto-
matic or strategic in origin. The issue is difficult
to resolve, because the question is how accommo-
dating the laws of synthesis are that lie between
the objects one encounters in the social world
and the abstract objectivities as a logic of prac-
tice. Adam Smith was saying that repeated ob-
servations of certain combinations of different
things become habituated, and that such observa-
tions are responsible for the habituation of man’s
sense of beauty or magnificence. If such observa-
tions are disrupted by a new set of information,
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the old habit will gradually give way to a new one
with a different product of synthesis. Bourdieu
has this to say on this important issue :
The habitus which, at every moment, struc-
tures new experiences in accordance with the
structures produced by past experiences,
which are modified by the new experiences
within the limits defined by their power of se-
lection, brings about a unique integration,
dominated by the earliest experiences, of the
experiences statistically common to members
of the same class. Early experiences have par-
ticular weight because the habitus tends to en-
sure its own constancy and its defence against
change through the selection it makes within
new information by rejecting information capa-
ble of calling into question its accumulated in-
formation, if exposed to it accidentally or by
force, and especially by avoiding exposure to
such information . . . . . Through the systematic
‘choices’ it makes among the places, events and
people that might be frequented, the habitus
tends to protect itself from crises and critical
challenges by providing itself with a milieu to
which it is as pre-adapted as possible, that is, a
relatively constant universe of situations tend-
ing to reinforce its dispositions by offering the
market most favourable to its products. And
once again it is the most paradoxical property
of the habitus, the unchosen principle of all
‘choices’, that yields the solution to the paradox
of the information needed in order to avoid in-
formation. The schemes of perception and ap-
preciation of the habitus which are the basis of
all the avoidance strategies are largely the
product of a non-conscious, unwilled avoidance,
whether it results automatically from the con-
ditions of existence (for example, spatial segre-
gation) or has been produced by a strategic in-
tention (such as avoidance of ‘bad company’ or
‘unsuitable books’) originating from adults
themselves formed in the same conditions. (LP,
pp. 60-61).
In Distinction (1984), Bourdieu turns his atten-
tion to the question of how life-styles are con-
structed to constitute the social space with appro-
priate signs of distinction, by returning to the site
of habitus as the source of the generative princi-
ple of this space. Taking an institutional approach
to sociological investigations of the social space,
he holds that the question of what the social
space is and how it is constructed should be
raised within this space itself. In his view, the so-
cial space is a classified structure, hence there
must be a classifying act, itself classifiable, that
produces this structure. Where else can we find a
principle that generates the social space but in
the principle of the habitus. The habitus is a set of
dispositions whose systematicity and transport-
ability is assured by the fact that it is both a
structuring structure (modus operandi) and a
structured structure (opus operatum), and that,
by the virtue of this combined structure, the in-
ternalization of the habitus in the mind of agents
becomes the source of life-styles supported by a
distribution of symbolic capital and power in the
social space. This is what Bourdieu says :
The relationship that is actually established
between the permanent characteristics of eco-
nomic and social condition (capital volume and
composition, in both synchronic and diachronic
aspects) and the distinctive features associated
with the corresponding position in the universe
of lifestyles only becomes intelligible when the
habitus is constructed as the generative for-
mula which makes it possible to account both
for the classifiable practices and products and
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for the judgements, themselves classified,
which make these practices and works into a
system of distinctive signs. . . . . . The habitus is
necessity internalized and converted into a dis-
position that generates meaningful practices
and meaning-giving perceptions ; it is a gen-
eral, transposable disposition which carries out
a systematic, universal application-beyond the
limits of what has been directly learned-of the
necessity inherent in the learning conditions.
(Distinction, p. 170).
Since the social space is an ideational objectiv-
ity grasped by the intentional act of man’s mind,
there must be laws of construction or synthesis
by which this act identifies the life-styles as quali-
fied sign systems of some kind. In this sense, the
life-styles and associated class consciousness are
an active product of the habitus, not an objective
truth that is spontaneously generated and lies out
there independent of this act. The habitus has its
own dialectic movement between the conditions
of existence and the formation of the dispositions
that reflect them as acting principles of construc-
tion. In the construction of the social space, this
dialectic movement takes place through lifestyles
and a distribution of symbolic capital to go with
them, in the plane of perceived differences in the
mind of agents, while the practices and products
of agents of the same class preserve the objectiv-
ity of such differences without any conscious ef-
fort at orchestration (Distinction, pp. 172-173). If
the mind of agents, so far as the act of synthesis,
difference, and identity is concerned, is pre-
structured by the structuring structure of the ha-
bitus and if life-styles are the products differenti-
ated by the structuring structure of the habitus,
there must be something that mediates the two
in their structuring-structured relationships. This
something, as the generative formula of life-
styles, Borudieu identifies, is taste. Think of the
universe of objects as an order of physical bodies
that are more or less continuously distributed
with little symbolic distinction, that is mapped
into the universe of symbolic expressions of life-
styles as an order of symbolic distinctions. And,
also think of the universe of objectively classified
practices that is mapped into the universe of clas-
sifying practices of symbolic expression. These
two mappings are performed by taste, the first
mapping as part of opus operatum of the habitus,
and the second mapping as part of modus oper-
andi of the habitus as a systematic expression of
the condition of existence which constitutes a life
style (LP, 173-175). It is this system of a life-style,
which is brought about by the internalization of
the structure of social space with all its symbolic
expressions, that transforms the necessity (or the
limitations) into the virtue of making appropriate
choices that constitute it. In a sense, life-styles are
the bounding or the shaping of a taste by the ha-
bitus. It naturally follows from Bourdieu’s argu-
ment that an agent’s preferences are inseparable
from the conditions of existence ; his taste is part
of the opus operatum and the modus operandi of
the habitus already. Choices and the regularities
that they exhibit within a budgetary constraint
accord with the self-fulfilling nature of prefer-
ences that reflect the condition of existence. The
non-mechanical relationship between the neces-
sity of this condition and the virtuous nature of
the choices made is central to Bourdieu’s position
that the social space is constructed and repro-
duced continuously from within the habitus
through life-styles as symbolic expressions and
tastes as a medium that turns mere objects into
symbolic ones and takes classified practices into
classifying ones of symbolic expressions.
Each life-style is a system of symbolic expres-
sions maintained by a taste, and there are, in the
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society, multiple life-styles with appropriate dis-
tributions of symbolic capital. But, in Bourdieu’s
thinking, the principles of oppositions and correla-
tions constituting different systems of life-styles
are structurally homologous to one another. Be-
cause this homology is based on the fact that
such systems are homologous to the structure of
the objective oppositions between class condi-
tions, the generative schemes of the habitus ap-
ply extensively across varying life-styles of differ-
ent classes despite their dissimilar practices and
choices made. Given this homology, Bourdieu, ar-
guing that the dispositions and practices of differ-
ent classes are differentiated by the degree to
which economic and cultural capital are appropri-
ated, show how the two key principles (or axes),
namely, economic capital and cultural capital, or-
ganize the universe of life-styles and govern the
space of cultural consumption. The rich appropri-
ate both capital, and the poor lack both. Hence,
their tastes and virtues develop in different direc-
tions. The rich and the dominant develop the
tastes of luxury and freedom, while the opposite
the tastes of necessity. Even in art, those at the
top tend to appreciate a denial of the social world
along a hedonistic aesthetic of ease and facility,
whereas the dominated, caught between ambi-
tion and restraint, develop an aesthetic disposi-
tion for self-imposed austerity, restraint, reserve,
and relaxation in tension, and tend to praise a
pessimistic representation of the social world.
Such stylization of life permeates all areas of
practices, in language where the opposition is ob-
served between the refined and the outspoken
styles of speech, in body language between the
noble and the fast gestures, and in primary tastes
between quantity and quality. This two-way or-
ganization of the social space, by way of economic
and cultural capital, helps explain the differences
in tastes of those who belong to the same income
bracket but differ in the cultural capital they pos-
sess. Economic variables, therefore, are neces-
sary in explaining human behavior, because such
variables measure the distance from or the prox-
imity to the necessity and the degree of freedom
from the material constraint, but they are, by
themselves, not sufficient to account for the hu-
man proclivities to look for symbolic profits of cul-
tural consumption in the social world (Distinction,
pp. 175-177). The taste of necessity forms the ba-
sis of a life-style only by the relationship of priva-
tion vis-à-vis other life styles (Distinction, p.
193). In this sense, a life-style as a classificatory
system can be as such only if it is defined by
what it lacks, not by what it has.
While in the theories of Adam Smith and Ve-
blen, the habituation of the apperceptive activity
of man’s mind plays a crucial role in determining
the course of cultural evolution, the active princi-
ple of habituation is taken for granted. Boudieu,
on the contrary, goes directly into the site where
habituation takes place and sees that it is the ac-
tive principle of habitus that produces the social
space of life-styles with a distribution of cultural
capital. Bourdieu’s thesis is : The knowledge of
the social world is the product of an act of con-
struction mediated by a system of internalized
embodied schemes based on the principles of di-
vision common to all agents, and such divisions
are revealed in the opposition between the domi-
nant and the dominated. Bourdieu holds that
there is a correspondence between the real world
(social structures of real divisions) and the
thought world (the mental structures of the prac-
tical principles of division), and, in consequence,
the relations of order that run through them are
accepted as self-evident structures of the social
world and become embodied in people’s schemes
of cognition, although such cognition is a miscog-
nition. It is this conformity that “makes it possible
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to act as if one knew the structure of the social
world, one’s place within it and the distances that
need to be kept” (Distinction, p. 472).
In Bourdieu’s theory, the system of classifica-
tory schemes in the habitus is not a taxonomy of
the social reality constructed by an intellectual
operation. The sense of social space is always the
product of a pre-adapted scheme of classification
in a particular situation. For him, the content of
the logic of practice and the image projected by
classificatory schemes is inherently fuzzy but
fluid, depending on man’s position in the social
space, but the social structure is inscribed into
one’s taste like a ‘memory jogger’ that finds its
expression practically in all acts and gestures
within the location of the social space (Distinction,
pp. 472-475). It has to be kept in mind that the in-
terest in using classificatory schemes or making
attributive judgments is inherently related to the
advantage of doing so, which has to be taken into
account in any inquiry into the social world (Dis-
tinction, p. 476).
The classificatory schemes bring about a sys-
tem of the differences and distinction out of undif-
ferentiated continuity. If such schemes are insti-
tutionalized in the mind of individual agents, the
schemes will no longer be perceived as limita-
tions, and individual agents will act as agents of
production for the established order. Thus, classi-
ficatory systems become a principle of reproduc-
ing the established order of the society by main-
taining the differences by way of the symbolic
logic of differentiation. Such systems, therefore,
acquire a symbolic power that reproduces them-
selves as a symbolic logic of practice and distinc-
tion that is imposed on the mental structures of
individual agents without a sense of being co-
erced by it. (Distinction, p. 479)
And, finally, Bourdieu reiterates that social sci-
ence does not have to choose between social
semiology that aims at knowing the reality
through the logics of classification and the idealist
semiology that describes a social world as a prod-
uct of mental (linguistic) structures, or between
the objectivist and the subjectivist theories. What
we need is the practical knowledge of divisions
and classifications that social agents acquire by
internalizing the external conditions into their
dispositions. This brings us back to the thesis
that the habitus, as the site of the dialectic be-
tween the opus operatum and the modus operandi
of divisions and classifications, is what constructs
the social space in the mind of individual agents,
with the principles of division common to all
agents (Distinction, p. 483)
This is how Bourdieu explains the emergence
of the life-styles and the symbolic marks of dis-
tinction. The logic of practice at the site of the ha-
bitus is responsible for the construction of life-
styles as systems and for the development of a
taste that transforms the universe of undifferenti-
ated objects into the universe of classified objects
with symbolic meanings. But, the crucial factor
that is responsible for life-styles to emerge is how
much of economic and cultural capital is appro-
priated. Of the two, appropriation of economic
capital is primary, the reason being that acquisi-
tion of cultural capital is consequent upon accu-
mulation of wealth, which is just another name of
this capital. As the society splits into different so-
cial classes by accumulation of wealth, the rich
and the poor will be placed in different economic
conditions of existence that lead to different
styles of cultural consumption. The rich, as the
dominating class, are exempt of labor and acquire
cultural capital that allows them to develop the
tastes for luxury and freedom as well as the aes-
thetic sense along with a more refined code of de-
corum to go with such tastes. The poor, as the
dominated class, are placed in more straining eco-
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nomic conditions with less access to cultural capi-
tal and cultural consumption. Being ambitious
but restrained by their conditions of existence,
they develop tastes for a more austere style of
living. In both cases, the conditions of existence
are, by the principle of internalization of the habi-
tus, turned into systematic structures of virtues,
tastes, and aesthetic sense, that are classified as
different styles of living. But, social classes will
not remain as a rigid division as the economy pro-
duces innovations that will inevitably change the
composition of the wealthy and the poor. In sim-
ple terms, appropriation of economic and cultural
capital governs the space of cultural consump-
tion, which is a sweeping word for the social
space constituted by different life-styles of the
dominating and dominated classes.
One cannot help but see that Bourdieu’s theory
of the logic of practice and distinction resembles,
in logic, the theses of Adam Smith and Veblen.
Adam Smith, starting with the moral sentiments
that favor approbation and disfavor disapproba-
tion, explicates how the ambition to get ahead in
the race of wealth accumulation in order to win
the moral approval of the spectator drives the
economy, by dividing the society into the supe-
rior and inferior classes, with the principle of cus-
tom (another name of habituation) shaping the
virtues, the tastes, and the sense of beauty and
propriety of the two classes differently, with men
of the superior class setting a fashion with a re-
fined code of decorum that goes with it and with
men of the inferior class emulating this fashion as
something genteel and magnificent, all to win the
moral approval. In his theory, the moral senti-
ments are the sources of the two essential ele-
ments for the development of the economy as an
extending order : man’s ambition for success and
man’s sensitivities to sympathize more with joy
than with sorrow. The first, keeping man’s indus-
try, becomes a positive driving force of the econ-
omy by developing innovations, arts, and sciences
that that keep supplying the superior stations
with refined goods of contrivance, and the second
leads, under the principle of custom, to specific
forms of tastes and aesthetic sense that serve as
a screening principle on what is to be consumed
for the reputability, hence as an emulating and
avoidance force between the superior and infe-
rior stations of life. Adam Smith’s theory is, in-
deed, a theory of the dialectic between these two
forces of evolution that originate in man’s moral
sentiments. It is also an account of wealth accu-
mulation splitting the society into different
classes, whose styles of living and virtues become
differentiated but still united by the imagination
that the style of living of the superior stations,
with its refined tastes and code of decorum, is
something to be worth emulating. Veblen’s tho-
ery is not much different from this as it is equally
a theory of evolution based on the dialectic be-
tween the instinct of workmanship as a positive
principle of innovations on the one hand and ha-
bituated tastes as a regulative principle on the
other, i.e., a theory of the dialectic between pro-
duction and consumption. Bourdieu, returning to
the site of the habitus, elucidated the logic of
practice of the site as a structuring and struc-
tured structure, and gave an account of how the
society becomes differentiated into different
classes with different styles of living, virtues, and
tastes, and of how this class division is maintained
as a stable order. Bourdieu’s theory is more ex-
plicit on how man’s mind apprehends a corre-
spondence between the real world and the
thought world through his schemes of cognition
that are embodied in his dispositions. Bourdieu
called the cognition through such schemes a mis-
cognition, just as Adam Smith called the grand
order of the economy a deception. What is com-
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mon to the three theories is the evolution of the
social order viewed as the dialectic between the
appropriation of economic capital through accu-
mulation of wealth and the development of cul-
tural capital for the purpose of endowing con-
sumption patterns with their symbolic profits.
2d. Parsons : Institutionalization of need-
dispositions
With this understanding of the three theories,
it is useful to take a look at Parsons’ theory of so-
cial systems as developed in The Social System
(1951), since this theory looks at social systems
from a purely theoretical standpoint of integra-
tion. He builds his theory by following through
the necessary conditions that must be met before
society turns into a stable order. It is developed
along the following line of reasoning.
Parsons’ fundamental question in The Social
System (1951, hereafter SS) is : How the two sys-
tems, a social system and an action system of in-
dividual agents, become integrated. In his view,
an action system of individual agents is an inte-
grated system of motivational and cultural ele-
ments, whereas a social system is a structure of
roles and statuses that functionally integrates so-
cial actions of individual agents. The pressing
problem to be resolved before any integration of
these systems is hoped for is the problem of the
double contingency of actions of ego and alter. If
interacting agents’ actions are contingent loosing
sight of how to form complementary expecta-
tions, no society would have any chance of sub-
sisting as an integrated order. For this problem
to be resolved, actors must hold certain expecta-
tions that complement each other’s actions. Such
expectations are possible only if two conditions
are met : (1) There be symbolic systems of com-
munication, and (2) actors be mutually oriented to
the normative aspect of their expectations. The
latter condition is met only if agents are oriented
to common normative standards under some ap-
propriate measures of sanction for conformity
and deviation, and only if actors’ motivational
structure is integrated with such standards. This
integration at the personality level requires that
such values be internalized into their motiva-
tional structure by way of socially learned senti-
ments or value-attitudes. The motivational struc-
ture shaped by such internalization defines the
need-disposition of individual actors. When con-
formity with a value-orientation standard not
only fulfills the need-disposition of an actor but
also optimizes the reactions of other actors, the
normative standards are said to be institutional-
ized. Once the motivatonal structure is institu-
tionalized, the actor’s conformity to and deviation
from the value-orientation standard acquires the
meaning of gratification and deprivation. The
conformity to role expectations, accordingly, be-
comes an ego-ideal for an actor, with the moral
responsibilities it entails. Thus, Parsons’ answer
to the problem of the double contingency of ac-
tions and the integration of society as a system is
found in the formation of the need-disposition,
which, in his view, is possible only by the inter-
nalization of the common normative values into
the motivational structure of individual actors.
What is then the mechanism through which a
commonly shared system of symbols is inte-
grated into the personality structure of individual
actors? Parsons attends to three foci of integra-
tion : (1) the individual actor, (2) the interactive
system, and (3) a system of cultural patterning.
For the integration to be possible at these foci,
the psychoanalytic structure of the personality
has to be integrated with the social system. To
make this integration apprehensible, Parsons ar-
gues that sociological analysis of social systems
and psychoanalysis of the personality need to
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converge around some unifying conceptual
scheme that binds the two. Society is a system of
interacting individuals with cognitive, cathectic,
and evaluative orientations, and likewise culture
is a system of (1) the cognitive reference system,
(2) the system of expressive symbolism, and (3)
the system of moral standards. Therefore, if soci-
ety as a system of interacting agents is to be in
harmony with culture, these systems must per-
meate the three orientations. But, even if this per-
meation is completed, there must be a moral
regulator of emotional reactions that arise from
interaction. This function is performed by the su-
perego, which is acquired socially by learning
how to regulate such reactions in social interac-
tion by the guiding hand of the system of cultural
symbolism [Parsons (1952) ; Parsons, Shils, et al.
(1951)]
This is Parsons’ theory on how society as a sys-
tem of interacting individuals becomes inte-
grated as an order regulated by superego. Par-
sons, in essence, argues that the culture, explic-
itly as an organized whole of the three systems :
the cognitive system, the system of expressive
symbolism, and the system of moral standards,
needs to be introjected into the personality struc-
ture of individual agents before a system of inter-
acting individuals becomes a stable order, with
normative orientations that keep their behavior
in harmony with the culture. This is the reason
why Parsons says that “the integration of a set of
common value patterns with the internalized
need-disposition structure of individuals is the
core phenomenon of the dynamics of social sys-
tems,” and that the stability of any social social
system depends on the extent to which this inte-
gration is made possible (SS, p. 42). Parsons’ ap-
proach is neither phenomenological nor evolu-
tionary in nature, but, it breaks down the social
system into its essential components that need to
be integrated if it is to be sustained as a stable or-
der. While Adam Smith, Veblen, and Bourdieu fo-
cused on the process of cultural evolution or the
habituation of man’s natural propensities into cer-
tain dispositions which have a logic of practice of
their own that reflects social organization and the
state of culture, Parsons focused his attention on
what conditions need to be met to avoid the ulti-
mate chaos, the state of the war of all against all,
called the Hobbesian disorder. That is why the
condition of complementary expectations marked
a starting point of his analysis, that led eventually
to his theory on how individuals and society be-
come integrated, normatively and structurally.
Essential to this integration was the internaliza-
tion of common normative values into the motiva-
tional structure of individuals, and when this in-
ternalization is fulfilled in the sense of optimizing
the responses of all individuals against all other
individuals, the normative standards or values
can be said to have been fully institutionalized.
Parsons’ theory of institutionalization explains
why it is not legitimate to hold a dichotomous
view that splits the motivational structure of an
individual actor and the socio-cultural elements.
Interacting actors have cognitive, cathectic, and
evaluative orientations. Just as anything ex-
pressed verbally is mediated by a shared lan-
guage (an expressive symbolism with its logic,
which is socially acquired), an action in a social
system is an expression in reference to some cog-
nitive system (which includes knowledge and rea-
soning we share), some shared expressive-
affective symbolism (which confers symbolic
meanings), and a set of common moral and evalu-
ative standards (along with sanctions for confor-
mity and deviation), hence becomes interpretable
in a socially meaningful way. Consumption as an
act is no exception. It is an act of expressing one’s
need-disposition in reference to : (1) a shared ex-
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pressive symbolism (which makes it possible to
send a symbolic message to other spectators,
therefore becomes the source of symbolic profits),
(2) the cognitive knowledge we share about
choice objects, and (3) common moral and evalu-
ative standards (which legitimate and screen
what we consume in the light of what is socially
acceptable or valuable as a means of emulation,
and bring about a harmony between conformity-
deviation and gratification-deprivation). Thus, in
a broader picture of culture, a system of prefer-
ences of each individual consumer is a convoluted
preference-value system, convoluted in the sense
that it cannot be determined independently of
the facts of the social space, valued in the sense
that it absorbs the essential elements of culture in
orienting itself.
3. A phenomenological perspective :
Heidegger
Adam Smith calls the grand order a deception,
for there is nothing intrinsically beautiful about
the things that man is habituated to see as beauti-
ful, and Bourdieu likewise calls the relations of or-
der that run through a correspondence between
the real world and the thought world a miscogni-
tion, for there is nothing necessary about this cor-
respondence except that man sees it in his mind.
So the question is how the whole of undifferenti-
ated continuities is transformed into the universe
of differences and identities in the form of social
classes and their styles of living by man’s act of
intentionality, or, more specifically, how the social
space or the social world is constructed as such
by the synthesizing act of categorial intuition and
perception［Husserl ; Logical Investigations, 280
-283］. This question calls for a phenomenological
inquiry into this construction.
Heidegger, performing a phenomenological
analysis of Dasein (human existence) in Being and
Time, taking many elements from Aristotle’s Ni-
comachean Ethics, brought to light the Being of
Dasein as care, and how man, thrown into this
world, exists as Being-in-the-world and encoun-
ters entities. His ontological philosophy is particu-
larly pertinent to economics or socio-economics,
because man always exists alongside with things
that are encountered in his practical dealings.
But, man, in his circumspective vision over such
dealings, encounters things through their equip-
mentality. But, each item of equipment does not
exist as an isolated entity. It is related to all other
items of equipment, hence the equipments consti-
tute a totality of equipment in which each is
placed in relation to one another. Items of equip-
ment are something man uses in order to achieve
an end ; this in-order-to of equipment is its as-
signment. If so, man’s being-in-the-world is man’s
being-alongside-equipment-for-assignment. What
does this mean for man as Being-thrown-into-this-
world. Since the Being of Dasein is care, Being-
thrown-into-the-world is the Being-alongside-with
-entities-as-equipment. The Being of equipment is
the readiness-to-hand. Hence, the Being of Dasein
is always with the Being of the readiness-to-hand
in his practical dealings. Heidegger says :
. . . . We shall call those entities which we en-
counter in concern “equipments”. In our deal-
ings we come across equipment for writing,
sewing, working, transportation, measurement.
The kind of Being which equipment possesses
must be exhibited. The clue for doing this lies
in our fist defining what makes an item of
equipment-namely, its equipmentality.
Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an
equipment. To the Being of any equipment
there always belongs a totality of equipment, in
which it can be this equipment that it is. Equip-
ment is essentially ‘something in-order-to . . .’. A
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totality of equipment is constituted by various
ways of the ‘in-order-to’, such as serviceability,
conduciveness, usability, manipulability.
In the ‘in-order-to’ as a structure there lies an
assignment or reference of something to some-
thing. Only in the analyses which are to follow
can the phenomenon which this term ‘assign-
ment’ indicates be made visible in its ontologi-
cal genesis. Provisionally, it is enough to take a
look phenomenally at a manifold of such assign-
ments. Equipment-in accordance with its
equipmentality-always is in terms of its be-
longing to other equipment : inkstand, pen, ink,
paper, blotting pad, table lamp, furniture, win-
dows, doors, room. These ‘Things’ never show
themselves proximally as they are for them-
selves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill
up a room. What we encounter as closest to us
(thought not as something taken as a theme) is
the room ; and we encounter it not as some-
thing ‘between four walls in a geometrical
spacial sense, but as equipment for residing.
Out of this the ‘arrangement’ emerges, and it is
in this that any ‘individual’ item of equipment
shows itself. Before it does so, a totality of
equipment has already been discovered. (BT,
pp. 97-98)
. . . . The kind of Being which equipment pos-
sesses-in which it manifests itself in its own
right-we call “readiness-to-hand”. . . . . Dealings
with equipment subordinate themselves to the
manifold assignments of the ‘in-order-to’. And
the sight with which they thus accommodate
themselves is circumspection. (BT, pp. 98)
Men are engaged in practical dealings, which
are productive activities. Hence, entities in the vi-
sion of equipmentality are not the only things we
encounter. We also encounter the world in which
we do our work, and other people working along-
side and the users of the product live, that is, the
public world, and even more, the environing Na-
ture, which is accessible to everyone, all as ready-
to-hand. Practical engagement is, therefore, the
source of the discovery or the encounter, of the
things, the World, and the Nature, under the
sight of circumspection. Heidegger writes :
The work produced refers not only to the
“towards-which” of its usability and the
“whereof ” of which it consists : under simple
craft conditions it also has an assignment to the
person who is to use it or wear it. The work is
cut to his figure ; he ‘is’ there along with it as
the work emerges. Even when goods are pro-
duced by the dozen, this constitutive assign-
ment is by no means lacking ; it is merely in-
definite, and points to the random, the average.
Thus along with the work, we encounter not
only entities ready-to-hand but also entities
with Dasein’s kind of Being-entities for which,
in their concern, the product becomes ready-to-
hand ; and together with these we encounter
the world in which wearers and users live,
which is at the same time ours. Any work with
which one concerns oneself is ready-to-hand
not only in the domestic world of the workshop
but also in the public world. Along with the
public world, the environing Nature is discov-
ered and is accessible to everyone. In roads,
streets, bridges, buildings, our concern discov-
ers Nature as having some definite direction. A
covered railway platform takes account of bad
weather ; an installation for public lighting
takes account of the darkness, or rather of spe-
cific changes in the presence or absence of day-
light-‘the position of the sun’. In a clock, ac-
count is taken of some definite constellation in
the world-system. When we look at the clock,
we tacitly make use of the ‘sun’s position’, in ac-
171HAYAKAWA : Consumption and Production as Virtues in Cultural Evolution
cordance with which the measurement of time
gets regulated in the official astronomical man-
ner. When we make use of the clock-
equipment, which is proximally and inconspicu-
ously ready-to-hand, the environing Nature is
ready-to-hand along with it. Our concernful ab-
sorption in whatever work-world lies closest to
us, has a function of discovering ; and it is es-
sential to this function that, depending upon
the way in which we are absorbed, those enti-
ties within-the-world which are brought along
in the work and with it (that is to say, in the as-
signments or references which are constitutive
for it) remain discoverable in varying degrees
of explicitness and with a varying circumspec-
tive penetration. (BT, pp. 100-101).
Heidegger’s insight on how Dasein discovers
entities, the world, and the environing Nature re-
minds us of how connected man’s practical deal-
ings are to the World and the Nature. The Being
of Dasein is in unity with the Being of entities en-
countered, the World, and the Nature. When
Dasein understands a totality of the involvements
in unity through a prior understanding of the re-
lationships binding all assignments, it becomes
significance. Thus, the world emerges as the
world of this significance, a unity of all practical
dealings in which Dasein is involved. Heidegger
says :
Circumspective concern includes the under-
standing of a totality of the involvements, and
this understanding is based upon a prior under-
standing of the relationships of the “in-order-
to”, and the “towards-which”, the “towards-
this”, and “for-the-sake-of”. The interconnection
of these relationships has been exhibited ear-
lier as “significance”. Their unity makes up
what we call the “world”. (BT, p. 415)
What if the world man is thrown into, which is
discovered as the world of all practical dealings
and significance, is always already invested with
a culture of symbolism? Then, the world of en-
countered entities will include the cultural sym-
bols as another category of entities as ready-to-
hand, although they are not visible but quite as
real as other physical entities. But, just as to each
item of equipment, a totality of equipment be-
longs, to each symbol belongs a totality of sym-
bols that makes it a symbol. We might, therefore,
be allowed to take the world Dasein discovers as
a world based on a totality of cultural symbols
that are guiding man’s practical dealings as well
as the appreciation of the products coming out of
such dealings. Whatever man does, either for con-
sumption or production, is, therefore, always in-
vested with its cultural meaning regardless
whether the cognition of this meaning is a mis-
cognition or something else. In this view, con-
sumption is not just a consuming act to feed a
hungry stomach or to clothe a naked body ; it has
a manifold of its assignments including the in-
order-to-express-it as a symbol of some value
other than the sheer utility. It is not even inde-
pendent of production, since the product is pro-
duced with its customers in mind who seek it for
their end, whatever it may be.
In Heidegger’s thought, the fact that Dasein en-
counters the entities in the world as equipment
(ready-to-hand) is grounded in Dasein’s existence
as a Fact. The factuality of this Fact is the factic-
ity, which means that Dasein has always already
spread itself over many ways of Being-in-the-
world. What does this mean? Heidegger says :
. . . . Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact ; and
the factuality of such a fact is what we shall call
Dasein’s “facticity”. This is a definite way of Be-
ing, and it has a complicated structure which
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cannot even be grasped as a problem until
Dasein’s basic existential states have been
worked out. The concept of “facticity” implies
that an entity ‘within-the-world’ has Being-in-
the-world in such a way that it can understand
itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’ with the Being
of those entities which it encounters with its
own world. (BT, p. 82)
Dasein’s facticity is such that its Being-in-the-
world has always dispersed itself or even split
itself up into definite ways of Being-in. The
multiplicity of these is indicated by the follow-
ing examples : having to do with something,
producing something, attending to something
and looking after it, making use of something,
giving something up and letting it go, under-
taking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating,
considering, discussing, determining . . . . All
these ways of Being-in have concern as their
kind of Being which we have yet to character-
ize in detail. Leaving undone, neglecting, re-
nouncing, taking a rest-these too are ways of
concern ; but these are all deficient modes, in
which the possibilities of concern are kept to a
‘bare minimum’. (BT, p. 83)
Thus, it is seen that Dasein is always already in
the world with many ways of engaging and in-
volving with the world. The primary ways of this
engagement are practical and economic. It is this
facticity that underlies the logic of man’s practice
in practical dealings and economics in this paper.
Man’s behavior is made possible by encountering
entities as equipment and discovering the public
world and the environing Nature. But, the world
discovered is always the world invested with cul-
tural symbols. We always communicate with peo-
ple in the public world using the same language,
wearing and eating what is appropriate, and fol-
lowing the manners that conform with norms.
Cultural symbols are just as real as the practical
value that physical objects yield. Therefore, it is
essential that in apprehending the logic of prac-
tice, culture be recognized as the source of cer-
tain assignments of man’s behavior. What to con-
sume, how to consume, for what end to consume,
etc. is all part of the facticity of man’s existence,
including demonstrating the quality and the pro-
priety of consumption in the eyes of the public.
4. Husserl : Consciousness and transcen-
dence
Recall that Bourdieu saw a correspondence be-
tween the social structure of divisions and the
mental principles of division, which makes it pos-
sible for the relations of social order to be ac-
cepted as self-evident and conserved. This logical
conformity raises a question as to how it may be
disturbed by innovations, i.e., new information
that cannot be assimilated easily into the confor-
mity structure. Adam Smith and Veblen thema-
tized innovations as the creating principle that
can make refined styles of living possible as
something genteel and magnificent. Innovations
are brought about by man’s industry and dili-
gence, but they are screened for their serviceabil-
ity to refined and novel styles of living. But this
screening is made possible only if man’s tastes
and aesthetic sense are habituated as the sense of
novelty. Bourdieu’s theory of distinction, likewise,
relies on the principle of habituation he named
the habitus, where this principle is viewed as the
source of the active and passive principles of con-
struction, active as the habitus constructs in ac-
cordance with a logic of construction, passive as
the habitus has an internal structure that re-
ceives what is constructed. In all of these theo-
ries, habituation is the key principle, not as ha-
bituation in the static sense of having been ha-
bituated to like certain things but also in the dy-
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namic sense of being habituated to seek. Such ha-
bituation never keeps the state of man’s mind
and tastes fixed but evolving for the better and
novel. Thus, culture evolves by the interaction of
the two principles : the principle of habituation,
i.e., by a structured structuring structure in Bour-
dieu’s words, which turns into an attitude of seek-
ing, on the one hand, and the principle of creation
that turns out innovations that are absorbed into
what already is but changes it slowly or drasti-
cally.
If the social world is a product of man’s inten-
tional act of synthesis in accordance with the
laws of construction, and if this world is always
reconstructed as innovations inject new informa-
tion into it, this intentional act of synthesis must
be habituated into an attitude of transcendence.
Husserl introduced the method of the transcen-
dental phenomenological reduction (by an all-
embracing epoche or bracketing) to base philoso-
phy on a rigorous scientific foundation［e.g.,
Ideen, Britannica Article, The Crisis of European
Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenol-
ogy］. This reduction is a method of uncovering an
eidetic science, a science of essences. In the intro-
duction to Ideen I, Husserl lays out his plan of in-
vestigation :
Let us draw the preliminarily indicative lines
yet a little more definitely ; and let us start
from psychology as demanded not only by the
prejudices of the times but also by the internal
communities of the matter in question.
Psychology is an experiential science. Two
things are implied in the usual sense of the
world “experience : ”
1. It is a science of facts, of matters of fact in
David Hume’s sense.
2. It is a science of realities. The “phenomena”
that it, as psychological “phenomenology,” deals
with are real occurrences which, as such occur-
rences, if they have actual existence, find their
place with the real subjects to whom they be-
long in the one spatiotemporal world as the
omnitudo realitatis.
In contradiction to that, pure or transcenden-
tal phenomenology will become established, not
as science of matters of fact, but as a science of
essences (as an “eidetic” science) ; it will become
established as a science which exclusively
seeks to ascertain “cognitions of essences” and
no “matters of facts” whatever. The relevant re-
duction which leads over from the psychologi-
cal phenomena to the pure “essence” or, in the
case of judgmental thinking, from matter-of-
fact (“empirical”) universality to “eidetic” uni-
versality, is the eidetic reduction.
Secondly, the phenomena of transcendental
phenomenology will become characterized as ir-
real. Other reductions, the specifically tran-
scendental ones, “purify” psychological phe-
nomena from what confers on them reality and,
with that, their place in the real “world.” Our
phenomenology is to be eidetic doctrine, not of
phenomena that are real, but of phenomena
that are transcendentally reduced. (Ideen I, In-
troduction xx).
And, on the doctrine of phenomenological re-
ductions which are required to reach transcen-
dentally purified consciousness, Husserl has this
to say :
We now turn our thoughts back again to the
first chapter, to our observations concerning
the phenomenological reduction . It now be-
comes clear that, in contrast to the natural
theoretical attitude, the correlate of which is
the world, a new attitude must in fact be possi-
ble which, in spite of the “exclusion” of this psy-
174
chophysical universe of Nature, leaves us
something : the whole field of absolute con-
sciousness. Instead, then, of living naively in ex-
perience and theoretically exploring what is
experienced, transcendent Nature, we effect
the “phenomenological reduction.” In other
words, instead of naively effecting the acts per-
taining to our Nature - constituting conscious-
ness with their positings of something tran-
scendent, and letting ourselves be induced, by
motives implicit in them, to affect ever new
positings of something transcendent - instead
of that, we put all those positings “out of ac-
tions,” we do not“participate in them ; ” we di-
rect our seizing and theoretically inquiring re-
gard to pure consciousness in its own absolute
being. That, then, is what is left as the sought-
for “phenomenological residuum,” though we
have “excluded” the whole world with all physi-
cal things, living beings, and humans, ourselves
included. Strictly speaking, we have not lost
anything but rather have gained the whole of
absolute being which, rightly understood, con-
tains within itself, “constitutes” within itself, all
worldly transcendencies. (Ideen I, p. 113)
Husserl’s idea is clear : Ascending from psy-
chology as a science of facts to the transcendental
phenomenology as a science of essences is made
possible with a new attitude of bracketing all pos-
itings posited by the constituting consciousness
which takes the psychophysical universe of Na-
ture for granted. This attitude generates an un-
ceasing ascending movement in consciousness to-
ward an unlimited region of pure essences as a
phenomenological residuum. Such an attitude re-
quires that the practice of bracketing all positings
be habituated firmly, that is, that the natural
theoretical attitude that takes for granted the ex-
istence of the transcendent Nature be outmoded
by a new one that relativizes all posited products
of theoretical thinking. Sciences aim at their ulti-
mate rational foundations that establish them as
exact sciences, and since they are a product of
the mind, the phenomenology of such foundations
could be static and self-enclosing in that it aims at
a rigorous foundation only within the same atti-
tude or mindset taken for granted. The transcen-
dental phenomenology that Husserl aims at, on
the other hand, frees our mind toward a tran-
scendental philosophy of pure essences by ques-
tioning any positing by consciousness, even the
existence of nature that this positing takes for
granted. Since all sciences originate in the mind,
this movement from static to dynamic phenome-
nology is accomplished in steps, first from psy-
chology to transcendental psychology, and then
from this psychology to the transcendental phi-
losophy. This philosophy is not a final stage, since
it is a continuing inquiry into an ever higher re-
gion of pure consciousness and pure essences. On
the way to the transcendental phenomenology,
the construction of a phenomenological pure psy-
chology will serve as a propaedeutic to it. On the
systematic construction of a phenomenological
pure psychology, Husserl has this to say in his
Britannica article.
The systematic construction of a phenome-
nological pure psychology demands :
(1) The description of the peculiarities univer-
sally belonging to the essence of intentional
mental process, which includes the most
general law of synthesis : every connection
of consciousness with consciousness gives
rise to a consciousness.
(2) The exploration of single forms of inten-
tional mental process which in essential ne-
cessity generally must or can present them-
selves in the mind ; in unity with this, also
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the exploration of the syntheses they are
members of for a typology of their essences :
both those that are discrete and those con-
tinuous with others, both the finitely closed
and those continuing into open infinity.
(3) The showing and eidetic description［We-
sensdeskription］of the total structure［Ge-
samtgestalt］of mental life as such ; in other
words, a description of the essential charac-
ter［Wesensart］of a universal “stream of
consciousness.”
(4) The term “I” designates a new direction for
investigation (still in abstraction from the so-
cial sense of this word) in reference to the
essence-forms of “habituality” ; in other
words, the “I” as subject of lasting beliefs or
thought-tendencies - “persuasions” - (con-
victions about being, value-convictions, voli-
tional decisions, and so on), as the personal
subject of habits, of trained knowing, of cer-
tain character qualities.
(Husserl, Britannica article, section 1.5)
Once the pure psychology is established by
way of the psychological reduction, it serves as a
propaedeutic to the transcendental phenomenol-
ogy by transcendental reduction as built on the
psychological reduction. This reduction brings
about a new and absolute consciousness which
forms the absolute basis of the intersubjectivity.
The absolute consciousness is capable of grasp-
ing the psychological objectivation as a self-
objectivation of the transcendental I, and the psy-
chic intersubjectivity (the community of minds as
psychic entities) as an actualization of the tran-
scendental intersubjectivity, from which every
transcendent being derives its sense of being. In
the same Britannica article, Husserl describes
what the ascendance from the psychological to
the transcendental phenomenology achieves as
follows :
We would like to proceed here by introduc-
ing the transcendental reduction as built on the
psychological reduction - as an additional part
of the purification which can be performed on
it any time, a purification that is once more by
means of a certain epoche. This is merely a
consequence of the all-embracing epoche
which belongs to the transcendental question.
If the transcendental relativity of every possi-
ble world demands an all-embracing bracket-
ing, it also postulates the bracketing of pure
psyches and the pure phenomenological psy-
chology related to them. Through this bracket-
ing they are transformed into transcendental
phenomena. Thus, while the psychologist, oper-
ating within what for him is the naturally ac-
cepted world, reduces to pure psychic subjec-
tivity the subjectivity occurring there (but still
within the world), the transcendental phenome-
nologist, through his absolutely all-embracing
epoche reduces this psychologically pure ele-
ment to transcendental pure subjectivity,［i.e.,］
to that which performs and posits within itself
the apperception of the world and therein the
objectivating apperception of a “psyche［be-
longing to］animal realities.” For example, my
actual current mental processes of pure per-
ception, fantasy, and so forth, are, in the atti-
tude of positivity, psychological givens［or
data］of psychological inner experience. They
are transmuted into my transcendental mental
processes if through a radical epoche I posit as
mere phenomena the world, including my own
human existence, and now follow up the inten-
tional life-process wherein the entire appercep-
tion “of ” the world, and in particular the apper-
ception of my mind, my psychologically real
perception-processes, and so forth, are formed.
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The content of these processes, what is in-
cluded in their own essences, remains in this
fully preserved, although it is now visible as
the core of an apperception practiced again
and again psychologically but not previously
considered. For the transcendental philoso-
pher, who through a previous all-inclusive re-
solve of his will has instituted in himself the
firm habituality of the transcendental “bracket-
ing”, even this “mundanization” ［Verweltli-
chung, treating everything as part of the
world］of consciousness which is omnipresent
in the natural attitude is inhibited once and for
all. Accordingly, the consistent reflection on
consciousness yields him time after time tran-
scendentally pure data, and more particularly
it is intuitive in the mode of a new kind of expe-
rience, transcendental “inner” experience.
Arisen out of the methodical transcendental
epoche, this new kind of “inner” experience
opens up the limitless transcendental field of
being. This field of being is the parallel to the
limitless psychological fields, and the method of
access［to its data］is the parallel to the purely
psychological one, i.e., to the psychological-
phenomenological reduction. And again, the
transcendental I［or ego］and the transcenden-
tal community of egos, conceived in the full
concretion of transcendental life are the tran-
scendental parallel to the I and we in the cus-
tomary and psychological sense, concretely
conceived as mind and community of minds,
with the psychological life of consciousness
that pertains to them. My transcendental ego is
thus evidently “different” from the natural ego,
but no means as a second, as one separated
from it in the natural sense of the word, just as
on the contrary it is by no means bound up
with it or intertwined with it, in the usual sense
of these worlds. It is just the field of transcen-
dental self-experience (conceived in full con-
creteness) which in every case can, through
mere alteration of attitude, be changed into
psychological self-experience. In this transition,
an identity of the I is necessarily brought
about ; in transcendental reflection on this
transition the psychological Objectivation be-
comes visible as self-objectivation of the tran-
scendental I, and so it is as if in every moment
of the natural attitude the I finds itself with an
apperception imposed upon it. If the parallel-
ism of the transcendental and psychological
experience-spheres has become comprehensi-
ble out of a mere alteration of attitude, as a
kind of identity of the complex interpenetra-
tion of senses of being, then there also becomes
intelligible the consequence that results from it,
namely the same parallelism and the interpene-
tration of transcendental and psychological
phenomenology implied in that interpenetra-
tion, whose whole theme is pure intersubjectiv-
ity, in its dual sense. Only that in this case it
has to be taken into account that the purely
psychic intersubjectivity, as soon as the it is
subjected to the transcendental epoche, also
leads to its parallel, that is, to transcendental in-
tersubjectivity. Manifestly this parallelism
spells nothing less than theoretical equivalence.
Transcendental intersubjectivity is the con-
cretely autonomous absolute existing basis
［Seinsboden］out of which everything tran-
scendent (and, with it, everything that belongs
to the real world) obtains its existential sense
as that of something which only in a relative
and therewith incomplete sense is an existing
thing, namely as being an intentional unity
which in truth exists from out of transcenden-
tal bestowal of sense, of harmonious confirma-
tion, and from an habituality of lasting convic-
tion that belongs to it by essential necessity.
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(Britannica article, section 2.4)
That is, the empirical psychical ego has to be
overcome by the transcendental psychical ego,
and this ego also has to be overcome of the tran-
scendental ego. With this overcoming, conscious-
ness rises from the level of the community of em-
pirical psychical egos (the psychic intersubjectiv-
ity) to that of the community of purely psychical
egos (the purely psychic intersubjectivity), and
even to that of the community of trascendental
egos (the transcendental intersubjectivity). Such
ascending opens a new horizon that allows man
to see anything below it as an incomplete objecti-
vation of pure essences. The psychological-
phenomenlogical-transcendental reduction is an
act of ascending from the Cave to pure essences,
that is made possible only with an unshaken atti-
tude that brackets everything that constituting
consciousness posits. The necessity of the incom-
pleteness of everything apprehended intersubjec-
tively in the shadows of the Cave is made evident
when cast under the light of pure essences
［Plato, Republic, Book VII］.
Heidegger focused on the ontology of human
existence and brought to light the priority of the
practical over the theoretical. Dasein exists as
care and as a Fact of its facticity with all its orien-
tations, sensitivities, dealings, and what not, and it
is Dasein’s practical dealings as its facticity that
make it possible for Dasein to encounter other be-
ings (entities) through their equipmentality, the
world as the public world of practical dealings,
and even the environing Nature through its im-
pact on Dasein’s activities. Thus, Dasein’s Being
is always Being-in-the-world. If so, how Dasein ex-
ists cannot be separated from how it understands
the world of its Being. Heidegger’s philosophy
shifts our attention, away from the theoretical un-
derstanding of the world and the behavior of man
in it, to Dasein’s practical dealings and the practi-
cal understanding of the world. That is, Dasein is
engaged in its activities in the life-world of every-
dayness, and it lives its life of practical dealings.
Therefore, Dasein’s act of intentionality, rather
than synthesizing various elements into an objec-
tive world as a theoretical unity and determining
its acts in relation to this structure, apprehends
the worldhood of the world in which to unveil its
practical Being. If Dasein finds itself already
thrown into the world through its practical deal-
ings having their ends, the entities encountered
are already invested with values of these ends,
practical or symbolic. Dasein’s acts, therefore, will
be composed in accordance with them and ren-
dered interpretable in terms of such values.
Heidegger says that“Dasein ‘is’ essentially for the
sake of Others” (p. 160). If so, all activities in
which Dasein is engaged are mediated by the in-
tersubjectivity, which cannot have its Being
apart from the culture.
Husserl, focusing on man’s consciousness awak-
ened us on the phenomenological-transcendental
reduction, which takes us from the world of the
empirical psychical determination to the world of
the transcendental psychical principles, and on to
the world of pure consciousness. With this as-
cending, man’s sense of ego rises from an empiri-
cally determined psychical ego, to a purely psy-
chological ego, and to a truly transcendental ego
free from any psychical and empirical determina-
tion. This way man reaches the absolute basis of
intersubjectivity from which to understand an
empirically determined ego as a self-objectivation
of the transcendental psychical ego, and from
which to understand the transcendental psychi-
cal ego as a possible instantiation of the truly
transcendental ego. But, this transcendence has
no ceasing point. It is an unceasing quest for a
limitless field of pure essences, which would not
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be possible unless transcendental bracketing is
firmly habituated and established as an unshak-
able attitude.
Husserl says that the transcendental phenome-
nology is a science of true essences. In achieving
this science, man’s consciousness must seek an
ever higher ground on which such essences may
be grasped. Anything man claims to have appre-
hended as an essence must be bracketed for a
further search for a higher essence, and this
bracketing turns into a ceaseless dialectic. This is
why the transcendental phenomenology is not
something that can be found by philosophical in-
vestigations once and for all. Rather it is an open
science of a dialectic movement of reason. If
man’s Being is the Being of the act of transcen-
dence to a limitless field of essences, and if the
consciousness is an act of intentionality (an act of
synthesis), all objectivities in consciousness are
made intelligible only if they are understood
either as a self-objectivation of a principle or as
an instantiation of the infinite possibilities. Since
everything constituted in consciousness is an
ideational objectivity, the act of transcendence
and the mundane activities in this world cannot
be separated. If the former aims at reaching
higher essences, so do the latter, aiming at better
activities through the discovery of such essences.
Aristotle says that man’s action (or activities), de-
termined by his internal rational principle, is al-
ways guided by the principle of aiming at better
performance or by the principle of entelecheia
［Metaphysics, Book IX ; Nicomachean Ethics］.
Practical dealings under circumspection that
Heidegger focused on as the primary ground of
Dasein are no exception to this rule as what is
conceived in such dealings (all ideational objec-
tivities) emanates from the intentional act of con-
sciousness. Whether in practical dealings or sci-
entific endeavors, man’s activities are made possi-
ble only by the power of consciousness, whose in-
ternal principle is to seek better performance.
5. Conclusion
Our primary concern in this paper was how to
apprehend the meaning and the essence of con-
sumption and production, or, more generally, all
activities man is engaged in, from the perspec-
tives of cultural evolution and phenomenology of
man’s existence and consciousness. In the conven-
tional view, economic activities are divided into
two categories : production and consumption,
and the two are kept independent, with consump-
tion being dictated by preferences of individual
agents and with production being determined by
production technologies. The two activities are
not apprehended in their conjoined roles in the
dynamics of the cultural evolution. Consumption
is better apprehended as an expression of man’s
desire for a meaningful way of living in this
world, as a creative art, in this dynamics. Man’s
tastes should reflect this desire. Such desire must
be rooted in man’s consciousness, which has its
destiny in transcending itself.
With this view in mind, we have reviewed criti-
cally the three major theories of cultural evolu-
tion : Adam Smith, Veblen, and Bourdieu. Adam
Smith’s theory is founded on man’s moral senti-
ments, which give rise to man’s ambition and in-
dustry and mobilize a race of competition for the
applaud of the spectator. This race, mediated by
wealth accumulation, splits the society into differ-
ent classes with different virtues and tastes. The
wealthy class sets a fashionable style of living
with a refined code of decorum, which will be
emulated by the poor as something genteel and
magnificent. The wealthy try to distance them-
selves from the rest, while the poor busy them-
selves with catching up. Thus, man’s industry be-
comes a positive principle of producing innova-
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tive goods acquired by the wealthy. The principle
of custom and habit plays its part in this evolu-
tion by shaping man’s sense of beauty and propri-
ety. Adam Smith’s theory is essentially a theory
that explains the socio-economic and cultural evo-
lution in terms of how man’s moral sentiments
turn man’s nature into two virtues : industry
serving as the productive principle and the ha-
bituated sense of beauty and propriety serving as
an extensive principle of screening goods and
manners for their serviceability to what is con-
ceived to be a refined style of living. Our love for
the beautiful, the elegant, the useful, and the ap-
plaudable in the eyes of the public turns them
into the sense of nobility and keeps the grand or-
der of the economy extending without leaving
any part of it unaccounted for. This love also is
the source of man’s desire for better institutions
for the public welfare. Adam Smith thought : A
deception as it may be, this order evinces Provi-
dence.
We saw that Adam Smith’s theory was inher-
ited by Veblen. His version starts with the in-
stinct of workmanship as a socially acquired apti-
tude. This instinct habituates man’s proclivity to
value the honorific reputability, causing the sense
of beauty and usefulness and the honorific repu-
tability to be blended or circumvented into that
of novelty. The instinct of workmanship, setting
off a race of wealth accumulation, again splits the
society into the wealthy and the poor with their
own virtues and tastes, where the wealthy take
pride in being exempt from labor and regards la-
bor as debasing to the spirit of man. The leisure
class refines its code of decorum as a vicarious
means of expressing their exemption from labor,
and seizes consumption as another effective
voucher of a life of leisure. The virtues of indus-
try and thrift of the poor serve as the productive
principle of the economy, whereas the virtues of
the wealthy serve as the principle of surveillance
to screen goods for their serviceability to refined
styles of living. Emulation and avoidance be-
tween classes is motivated by the desire to attain
the honorific reputability. As in the case of Adam
Smith, the socio-economic and cultural evolution
is viewed as a dialectic between these two princi-
ples. The principle of habituation is again crucial
to Veblen’s theory. Man’s habits are a complex
organization of various habits of thought and in-
terests that are influencing one another as they
affect the apperceptive activitiy ; the canon of
honorific waste traverses the canons of moral
conduct, beauty, utility, fitness, and what not,
even the sacredness of the institution of the pri-
vate property.
Bourdieu returned to the site of habitus, man’s
habituated state of mind called dispositions, in ex-
plaining why the society divides into different
classes with different virtues. This division is sus-
tained by the internalization of the conditions of
existence with all its logic of division. The habi-
tus, in this sense, has an active structuring princi-
ple and a passive structured principle that are in
conformity. The class division, in Bourdieu’s view,
is brought about by appropriation of two types of
capital, economic and cultural. The former closes
the distance to the material means of acquisition,
and the latter is needed for life-styles of distinc-
tion. While the society is divided into different
classes, this division is dynamic, since man’s life-
styles themselves are defined not so much by
what they have as what they lack vis-à-vis other
life styles. Turning man’s conditions of existence
into the virtues of liking what is affordable does
not keep man from having a desire to move up
the social ladder by appropriating economic and
cultural capital. Although Bourdieu’s theory does
not make this movement explicit because the ha-
bitus is regarded as the site of active and passive
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principles of division and conformity, his insis-
tence that all social classes, dwelling in their own
habitus, are homologous in structure should be
taken to imply that a possible dialectic movement
of class division is already present in the actual-
ized division and that this dialectic is mobilized
by the exposure to new information that distur-
bes the stability of the habitus. In his theory, the
habitus is the generative principle of not only the
logic of practice in practical dealings but also all
the thoughts, perceptions, and actions ; the habi-
tus is also essential for the full realization of insti-
tutions. Consumption is no exception ; it ex-
presses the conditions of existence mediated by
the taste that maps sheer objects into symbolic
ones, depending on how much of economic and
cultural capital is appropriated.
The three theories converge on this logic :
Through appropriation of wealth or capital, soci-
ety spontaneously divides itself into different
classes by turning the conditions of existence into
virtues : the virtues of the wealthy and the vir-
tues of the less wealthy. The first virtues are fo-
cused on freedom, independence, and generosity
and on the cultivation of the styles of living along
with a code of decorum, that culminates in a re-
fined art of consumption, and the second virtues
on industry, prudence, justice, parsimony, and ob-
servance of strict rules, which are responsible for
the development of sciences and arts and for the
activities of production and innovation. The two
are held together by the habituation of the apper-
ceptive activity of mind, in which the sense of
aesthetic beauty is turned into circumvented
tastes for noble and novel goods, that are met by
innovations. Such circumvented tastes are shared
commonly and become the source of aspiration
and emulation. Thus, the society evolves by the
virtues of freedom and independence on the one
hand and industry and parsimony on the other,
that is, by the virtues of consumption and produc-
tion.
Parsons’ theory of social systems affirms that
man’s actions are voluntarily determined with
their cognitive, cathectic, and evaluative orienta-
tions correlated with the three systems of the cul-
ture : the cognitive reference system, the system
of expressive symbolism, and the system of moral
standards. If actions of individual agents are inte-
grated with a social system, by way of the inter-
nalization of common normative values, man’s ac-
tions and a social system can constitute a stable
co-movement. This theory, therefore, is suppor-
tive of the view that the meaning of man’s activi-
ties is closely related to the culture in which they
are embedded. They are all founded on the need-
dispositions in which common normative values
are internalized. Parsons’ theory, however, alerts
us on a possible dilemma between institutional-
ized dispositions and innovations that disturb
them. How the need-dispositions open up to inno-
vations and assimilate them is a matter that is not
fully addressed in his theory.
We extended our investigation to a phenome-
nological inquiry into man’s consciousness and
ontological existence. Heidegger’s analytic of
Dasein and his insight that man exists primarily
through practical dealings is particularly perti-
nent to our discussion. In Heidegger’s view, it is
through practical dealings that man encounters
various entities, the public World, and the envi-
roning Nature. Before man’s existence is thema-
tized, man already ‘is’ as Being-in-the-world en-
countering various entities through their equip-
mentality, where this equipmentality has its as-
signments of the in-order-to’s. This spontaneity of
man’s practical dealings is what constitutes man’s
Being in the lifeworld of everydayness. How to
live one’s life, how to interpret the activities one
is engaged in, is left to the deliberation of the indi-
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vidual living his life of practical dealings. Man’s
ontological existence, therefore, is prior to any
formulation, and gazing it as it is reveals the
truth of this existence. If Dasein is Being-in-the-
world and if Dasein encounters entities as equip-
ment through practical dealings, this Being is
lived in the culture as well, in which Dasein un-
avoidably encounters many products of culture
as ready-to-hand. The most prominent of such
products is the language itself. When interpreting
man’s activities, it should be kept in mind that the
world of practical dealings is where their mean-
ings are found.
Husserl’s phenomenology on man’s conscious-
ness as an act of intentionality has much to say on
the theme of this paper. All of man’s activities
emanate from his consciousness. Consciousness,
by its act of intentionality and by its power of in-
tuition (perceptive and categorial), constructs the
objectivities as irreal objects (ideational objects),
and unifies them into some unity. Such objectivi-
ties have their Being as essences or ideas, hence
the act of intentionality is an act of discovering
ideas by the power of categorial intuition. But,
ideas, no matter how pure, are unlimited. Man’s
consciousness is, therefore, destined for an unlim-
ited region of pure essences. Husserl awakened
us on this destiny, that man’s consciousness is
open to this limitless field of pure ideas. As long
as man’s consciousness is bounded by his own ex-
perience under the laws of psychical phenomena,
man’s ego will stay at the level of a psychical ego
of empirical origin, but if the consciousness tran-
scends it by the purifying act of bracketing, it will
first discover a pure psychical ego, that is, the
transcendental psychological ego, which can un-
derstand the former as a self-objectivation of the
latter, and then the transcendental ego, which
can understand the pure psychical ego as one of
its possible instances. This ascending is not auto-
matic as the history of thought amply reveals ; it
has not been easy for mankind to free himself
from the shackles of the Cave. The ascending re-
quires a new attitude, and this attitude has to be
habituated firmly. Man’s activities are made pos-
sible by a synthesis of the ideational objectivities
that are captured by his mind. If so, they should
become better with innovations in science,
mathematics, technology, and so forth. Such inno-
vations are not given externally but must origi-
nate in man’s consciousness transcending to new
ideas and principles. Also, it cannot be ignored
that man’s activities, both in sciences and in prac-
tical dealings, are based on the rules of conduct,
whose laws will not become fully visible unless
man’s ego reaches the transcendental ego as the
true basis of the intersubjectivity. Husserl’s as-
cendence to the transcendental ego as this basis
is consistent with Kant’s view that man is a ra-
tional being capable of constituting a moral law
as a universal law and of acting autonomously in
accordance with this law［Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals ; Critique of Practical Rea-
son］. To be sure, this transcendence is a sponta-
neous movement from within with a new attitude
and is achieved only by the free spirit of man.
This brings us back to the view expressed at the
outset, that the socio-economic order is a uni-
verse, not an artificial arrangement, that evolves
by its internal principles, the noblest of which is
man’s will to transcend to an unlimited region of
new ideas and pure essences. The theories of
Adam Smith, Veblen, and Bourdieu make more
sense when their generative principles, positive
or regulative, are viewed from the standpoint of
man’s desire for this transcendence, be it for a
better art of living or for the development of sci-
entific knowledge and technology. Culture
evolves with a habituated attitude and refined
virtues, which direct man’s endeavors in all areas
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of his activities, intellectual or practical. Man’s
progress is thus founded on two principles : insti-
tutionalization of dispositions in accordance with
the logic of division, and the transcending act of
consciousness toward higher ideas and purer es-
sences in search for the absolute basis of the in-
tersubjectivity.
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